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Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of capital structure decisions on firm performance using a 
sample of 22listed Non-financial firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for a period of five years 
(2011 – 2015). The study examined the impact of STDTA, LTDTA, and TDTE (being the 
explanatory variables) on ROA and ROE, which represents the dependent variable while controlling 
for size, tangibility and Growth. The panel dataset were analysed using pooled, fixed effect and 
random effect models while Hausman‘s test were used to select the appropriate model. On the ROA 
model (panel A), the ratio of short term debt to total asset (STDTA) and total debt to total equity 
(TD/TE) have significant negative effect on performance. The ROE model (panel B) revealed that 
short-term debt to total asset (STDTA) and long-term debt to total asset (LTDTA) have significant 
positive effect on ROE while total debt to total equity (TD/TE) has significant negative effect. Firm 
size has significant positive effect in both models (ROA and ROE). This implies that, the inclusion of 
debt (both short term and long term) in the capital structure of a firm positively affect the equity 
shareholders in terms of firm performance while debt holder might be affected negatively.  
Keywords: capital structure; financial performance; returns on equity; earnings per share; agency 
theory 
JEL Classification: D22 
 
1. Introduction 
The quest for firms to expand their activities, maximise their shareholders‘ wealth 
and compete effectively in the industry where they operate cannot be over-
emphasised. It is an undeniable fact that the going concern and the performance of 
a firm hinge on some important factors such as: qualified management board, 
pragmatic strategies, availability of finance, among others. Therefore, for firms to 
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achieve their goals and objectives, taking into cognisance their limited resources, 
they necessarily need to strategize on how to finance their activities. 
Basically, the sources of finance available to an entity include: equity, debt, and 
earnings. Equity refers to the fund invested into a firm by its shareholders, while 
debt is the fund sourced from other capital providers, which crystallised at a 
specified date. Earnings on the other hand, refer to the profit generated by a 
company in its business activities. However, since earnings may not always be 
sufficient for an organisation to run its activities due to tax and dividend 
dependability on it, hence, the major sources of fund available to a firm is equity 
and debt. 
The maxim ―quid pro quo‖ meaning something for something operates in the world 
of finance. Every provider of capital be it shareholders, bondholders or debenture 
holders are only willing to sacrifice their fund with the expectation of receiving 
either dividend or interest in return. Therefore, in taking financing decisions, 
decision makers need to establish the available sources of finance, the interest of 
the providers of such funds, its cost and benefits, the impact of those finance option 
on its overall activities, and most importantly the appropriate mix of all obtainable 
funds. 
Capital structure simply refers to the proportion of debt and equity in the financial 
framework of a firm. Therefore, since capital structure is the mixture of equity and 
debt, a firm may be all equity (ungeared/unlevered); or a mix of equity and debt 
(geared/levered). Empirical evidences assert that firms will select the mix of debt 
and equity that maximises the value of the firm (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). When 
an organisation intends to expand its investments, the need to raise funds is 
inevitable, which may alter its capital structure. 
An appropriate capital structure is a critical decision for any business organisation. 
The decision is important not only because of the need to maximise returns to 
various organisational stakeholders, but also because of the impact of such decision 
has on the survival of the business. Despite its theoretical appeal, researchers in 
corporate finance are yet to agree on the optimal level of capital structure; as well 
as the relationship between leverage and firm performance (Mykhailo, 2013). 
While some studies established a negative impact, others maintain that a positive 
impact exists. Due to the contradictory opinion of finance economists on the 
subject matter, this study is set to explore the impact of capital structure decision of 
managers on firms‘ performance, ala return on both capital and asset utilized. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two contains theoretical and 
literature review, the next section discusses the methodology. The fourth section 




2. Theoretical and Literature Review 
Since the publication of the Modigliani and Miller‘s (1958) work titled 
―irrelevance theory of capital structure‖, the theory of corporate capital structure 
has been a study of interest to finance economists. Over the years, different 
theories of capital structure have been propounded which diverge from the 
assumption of perfect capital markets under which the ―irrelevance model‖ is 
working. However, the commonest among these theories include; static trade-off 
theory, pecking order theory, and market timing theory. There is also a concern that 
agency cost affects the capital structure of a company.  
2.1. Static Trade off Theory 
Static trade-off theory asserts that there is a trade-off between the benefits of taking 
on more debt and the costs of higher indebtedness. The benefits of taking on debt 
(rather than equity) are mainly in the tax relief while the marginal costs of extra 
debt relate to the greater risks from financial distress. The theory therefore 
postulate that companies should have an optimal level of gearing and that the 
optimal gearing level for a company is reached at a point where the marginal 
benefits of taking on additional debt capital equals the marginal costs of taking on 
the extra debt. However, this theory have been criticised by several other theories 
on the basis that firms does not have an optimal gearing level. 
2.2. Pecking Order Theory 
Myers (1984) originated the theory. It attempts to criticise the static trade off 
theory, which hypothesise that firms have an optimal gearing level. Its progenitor 
opines that firms showed preference in choosing their sources of finance. The 
pecking order theory says the most preferred source of finance for firms is retained 
earnings follow by debt capital and lastly equity capital. The rationale behind this 
order is that, using retained earnings to finance investment is convenient and 
cheaper than any other sources of finance. However if retained earnings is 
unavailable or inadequate, debt capital will be used because of its relative tax 
advantage. The less preferred source of finance in the pecking order theory is 
equity capital this is because of the high cost involved in raising the capital. 
2.3. Market Timing Theory 
The market timing theory states that choice of financing method can be determine 
by the opportunities in the capital market and that these opportunities occurs as a 
result of asymmetry of information. Consequently, it is opined that management of 
companies should know when the future prospects for the company are better than 
investors are expecting, and when the prospects for the future are worse than 
investor expectation. Based on this privilege information, the theory suggests that 
management will therefore recognise occasions when the company‘s shares are 
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currently under-valued or over-valued. Hence, companies leverage on such 
information to issue new shares when they consider the share price to be over-
valued and will consider share repurchases when they consider the share price to be 
under-valued. Taking advantage of opportunities in the market to issue new shares 
or buy back existing shares affects the gearing level. In sum, the theory posits that 
companies do not have a target optimal gearing level and that market opportunity 
and market timing determine their financing decisions often. 
2.4. Theory of Agency Cost 
This theory is originated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The theory states that 
various interest groups, comprising of the company‘s shareholders, providers of 
debt capital and the management, affect the capital structure of a firm. According 
to this theory, each interest group has it preference and objectives; therefore, in 
choosing a method of finance, a balance must be strike in compensating the interest 
of the shareholders, debt providers and management. In conclusion, the agency cost 
theory only buttress the submission of the static trade off theory by submitting that 
―optimal‖ capital structure for a company is obtained by trading off not just the 
marginal benefits and marginal costs of extra debt but also by trading off the 
―agency costs‖ of additional debt and/or the ―agency costs‖ of additional equity. In 
practice, such cost eventually diminish the net benefits or return available for 
distribution to business owners, thus, its barometer is set in terms of wealth of 
owners. The study therefore tests the veracity of Static trade off versus Agency 
Cost theories using Nigerian data.  
2.5. Empirical Review 
Based on the foregoing theories, several authors across the globe have made 
attempt to ascertain the impact of capital structure on firms‘ performance.  
In Kenya, Lucy (2014) investigates the relationship between capital structure and 
performance of non-financial companies. The study employed an explanatory non-
experimental research design using a sample of 42 non-financial companies in 
Nairobi Securities and Exchange for the period of 2006-2012. The study revealed 
that financial leverage had a statistically significant negative association with 
performance. The study recommended that managers of listed non-financial 
companies should reduce the reliance on long-term debt as a source of finance. 
Similarly in Nigeria, Osuji and Odita (2012) examines the impact of capital 
structure on financial performance of Nigerian firms using a sample of thirty non-
financial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange during the seven (7) year 
period, from 2004 to 2014. Panel data for the selected firms were compiled and 
analysed using the ordinary least squares as a method of estimation. The result of 
their study showed that a firm‘s capital structure has a significantly negative impact 
on the firm‘s financial performance. Lawal et al. (2014) in their study of the effect 
of capital structure on firm‘s performance among sampled firms in the Nigerian 
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manufacturing industry, observed that capital structure variables are negatively 
related to firms performance they however recommend that firms should use more 
of equity than debt in financing their operation. 
Mustafa and Osama (2013) also provide evidence from Jordon in their 
investigation of the impact of capital structure and corporate performance on 76 
Jordanian firms for the period 2001-2006 using the multiple regression model 
represented by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) found that capital structure associated 
negatively and statistically with firm‘s performance. Their study also revealed that 
the impact of gearing on the performance of highly geared and lowly geared firms 
is insignificant. In addition to the foregoing, divers authors, Bokhtiar et al. (2014), 
Varun (2014), Onaolapo and Kajola (2010), Ebaid (2009), Shan and Khan (2007), 
Zeitan and Tian (2007), Haung and Song (2006), Deesomsak et al. (2004) and 
Gleason et al. (2000) have all concluded that  capital structure statistically and 
negatively impact firm‘s performance, using the different methodologies and 
country data.  
Conversely in Pakistan, Mubeen and Kalsoom (2014) in their investigation of the 
impact of capital structure on financial performance and shareholders‘ wealth 
sampling 155 firms in the Pakistan Textile Sector concluded that capital structure 
positively impact firms financial performance and shareholders‘ wealth. Similarly, 
in Sri Lanka, Nirajini and Priya (2013) also investigate the impact of capital 
structure on financial performance. The study employed correlation and multiple 
regression analysis. Their findings revealed that there is a positive relationship 
between capital structure and financial performance and that capital structure 
significantly affects performance. Other authors have also concluded that capital 
structure has a mixed effect on firms performance. (Zeitan & Tian, 2007) 
Berger and Bonaccorsi (2006), in their study of the impact of capital structure on 
firm‘s performance concluded that neither higher leverage nor lower equity capital 
ratio are connected with higher profit efficiency for all range of data. Also, Phillips 
and Sipahioglu (2004) in their study of the impact of capital structure on firm‘s 
performance using the UK lodging firms as sample concluded that there is no 
significant link between capital structure and firm‘s performance. 
 
3. Methodology 
The nature of this research demands the use of quantitative research design 
including ex-post facto. The population of this study encompasses all non-financial 
firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) market, a sample of 22 quoted 
companies were purposively selected for this study. Data were extracted from 
audited annual reports and accounts of listed firms on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange, which spanned between 2011 and 2015. Evaluation concentrated on 
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post global financial crisis period in which data was available. In order to capture 
the impact of capital structure on firm performance, we specify a model 
conforming to the agency theory; as previously specified by Berger and di Patti 
(2006) as well as Margaritis and Psillaki. (2007, 2010) It was based on the 
assumption that managers have zero shareholding in the firm. Otherwise, managers 
will have no incentives to take a low value projects, as they maximize their own 
wealth. Besides, we assume that managers want to avoid firm liquidation and 
prefer not to pay dividends to shareholders. The literature suggests many ways of 
measuring performance of the firm. Hammes and Chen (2004) used ROA as a 
measure of firm performance, since the basic accounting ratios are claimed to be 
improper indicators of firm performance.  
Concomitantly, Ward and Price (2006), adopted return on equity as an appropriate 
measure of performance, since it reveals how much profit a company earned in 
comparison to the total amount of shareholder equity found on the balance sheet. A 
business that has a high return on equity is more likely to be one that is capable of 
generating cash internally. For the most part, the higher a company's return on 
equity compared to its industry, the better. 
Hence, we specified the following Models; 
ROAit = α0 + α1itSTD/TA + α2itLTD/TA + α3itD/E + α4itTANG + α5itGROWTH + 
α6itSIZE + µit …   3.1 ROEit = α0 + α1itSTD/TA + α2itLTD/TA + α3itD/E + 
α4itTANG + α5itGROWTH + α6itSIZE + µit   … 3.2   α0 is the constant, and α1,  α2,  
α3,  α4,  α5,  α6 are regression coefficients, while µit  is the error term 
Descriptive Variables: 
Variables Descriptive Sign 
Dependent Variable   
Financial Performance Market Value of Equity  
Net Asset Per Share  
Independent Variables   
Short term debt The ratio of short term debt 
to total asset. 
_ 
Long term debt The ratio of long term debt 
to total asset. 
_ 
Debt Equity The ratio of debt to equity.  
Control Variables:   
Asset Tangibility  The ratio of non-current 
asset to total asset. 
+ 
Growth % change in the log of total 
asset 
+ 





4. Analysis and Discussion of Result  
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 4.1 above showed the variables used in the study. Analysis indicated the 
average ROA is 0.03, the minimum is -1.20, while the maximum is 0.26. The 
standard deviation is 0.19. Relatively, ROE shows a mean value of 0.11, the 
minimum is -9.81; maximum is 9.05 while the standard deviation is 1.36. Both 
ROA and ROE showed negative skewness while the variables are leptokurtic in 
nature. The negative minimum value is attributable to a firm with a loss in a period. 
This low performance can be traced to such factors as inadequacy of electricity, 
high interest rate and depreciation in exchange rate. The ratio of the STDTA shows 
a mean value of 0.43 while Long Term Debt to Total Assets (LTDTA) has a mean 
value of 0.19. Both STDTA and LTDTA indicated positive skewness and the 
variables are leptokurtic, that is, they are highly peaked. The ratio of debt/equity 
has the mean value of 1.99, implying that the proportion of debts in the sampled 
firm is high; this is supported with the kurtosis value of 47.30; a leptokurtic 
variable. The ratio of tangible assets to total assets has the mean value of 0.57 
while the maximum is 0.98 and the minimum is 0.05, the variable is negatively 
skewed and has a low kurtosis, which implied a platykurtic variable with a low 
standard deviation. On the average, firms‘ size has an average value of 7.56 with a 
minimum and maximum of 9.05 and 6.36 respectively. The size of the firms is 
positively skewed with a low kurtosis value of 2.20, which implied a platykurtic 
variable. Finally, the mean value of the firm‘s growth is -1.44 with a minimum and 
maximum value of -11.91 and 0.94 respectively. The skewness of the firm‘s 
growth is -9.02 which implied negative skewness while the kurtosis stood at 87.09 
depicting a leptokurtic variable. 
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Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Source: Author’s Computation 
Table 4.2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables. LTDTA, DE, TANG, 
SIZE, and GROWTH are positively correlated with ROA; while STDTA is 
negatively correlated with ROA.DE has a negative correlation with ROE, while 
other variables showed a positive correlation. 
4.3. Regression Analysis 
In Panel A (the predictor is ROA), Hausman‘s test discriminate between the fixed 
and random effect models as presented in Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3. Panel A - Hausman Test 
Hausman Test – Panel A  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 9.523113 6 0.1462 
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
STDTA -0.39 -0.41 0.00 0.48 
LTDTA 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.76 
D_E -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06 
TANG 0.01 -0.08 0.00 0.19 
SIZE 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.84 
GROWTH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
The Hausman‘s chi-square statistics of 9.52 is not significant at 5%. Hence, it 
appears there is no correlation between the error term and one or more independent 
variables. Therefore, the random effect model is capable of generating more 
consistent estimate as against the fixed effect model. Thus, our discussion is based 




Table 4.4. Panel A: Dependent Variable is ROA 
 Pooled Model Fixed Effect Model Random effect Model 



































































R Squared 0.52 0.65 0.85 0.85 0.56 0.60 
Adj. R 
Squared 
0.51 0.63 0.81 0.81 0.54 0.58 
S.E 
Regression 
0.13 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
F Statistics 39.17 31.91 20.73 18.02 45.24 26.40 
Prob. Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observation 110 110 110 110 110 110 
N.B: figures in parentheses are standard errors.  *significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
Table 4.4 above showed the pooled regression result in models 1 and 2. In model 1 
above, STDTA has a significant negative effect on ROA while LTDTA and DE 
have insignificant negative relationship. This is consistent with the result of 
Bokhtiar et al. (2014) and Osuji & Odita (2012) which also reported that STDTA 
has a negative effect on ROA. Model 2 control for tangibility, size and growth. 
STDTA, D/E and Tangibility have negative significant effect on ROA, while Size 
has positive significant effect on ROA this is also evidence in Lucy (2014) and 
Mustafa (2013). Conversely, LTDTA has insignificant negative effect on ROA 
while Growth has insignificant positive effect on ROA 
The fixed effect is depicted in models 3 and 4 in Table 4.4 above. In model 3, 
STDTA and D/E have negative significant effect on ROA, while LTDTA has 
negative insignificant effect on ROA. Model 4 control for tangibility, size and 
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growth. STDTA, D/E, growth have negative insignificant effect on ROA, while 
LTDTA, Tangibility and Size have a positive insignificant effect on ROA. This is 
consistent with prior studies.
1
  
The random effect is captured by model 5 and 6 in Table 4.4 above. Model 5 
revealed that STDTA and D/E have negative significant effect on ROA, while 
LTDTA has negative insignificant effect on ROA. However, the controlled model 
represented by model 6 reveals that D/E has a negative significant effect on ROA 
while size has a positive significant effect on ROA. 
Table 4.5. Hausman Test – Panel B 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 46.034520 6 0.0000 
Variable Fixed Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
STDTA 1.25 0.08 0.13 0.00 
LTDTA 4.87 3.49 1.49 0.26 
D_E -0.26 -0.21 0.00 0.00 
TANG 0.24 -1.01 0.74 0.15 
SIZE 1.31 0.43 0.56 0.24 
GROWTH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 
In Panel B (the predictor is ROE) Hausman‘s test discriminates between the fixed 
and random effect models as presented in Table 4.5. The Hausman‘s chi-square 
statistics of 46.03 is significant at 5%. Hence, it appears there is correlation 
between the error term and one or more independent variables. Therefore, the fixed 
effect model is considered capable of generating more consistent estimate as 
against the fixed effect model. Thus, our discussion is based on the fixed effect 
model as presented in Table 4.5 and captured by models 3 and 4. 
  
                                                          
1 See (Bokhtair, 2014; Osuji & Odita 2012). 
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Table 4.6. Panel B- Dependent Variable- ROE 
 Pooled Fixed Effect Model Random Effect 
Model 




































































R Squared 0.52 0.58 0.74 0.75 0.52 0.58 
Adj. R Squared 0.51 0.55 0.66 0.67 0.51 0.55 
S.E Regression 0.95 0.91 0.79 0.78 0.95 0.91 
F Statistics 96.65 23.42 52.48 9.08 38.27 23.43 
Prob. Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       
N.B: figures in parentheses are standard errors. *significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
***significant at 10% 
Table 4.6 above showed the pooled regression result in models 1 and 2. In model 1 
above, LTDTA has a significant positive effect on ROE while DE has significant 
negative relationship. This is consistent with the result of (Osuji & Odita, 2012) 
which also reported that LTDTA has a positive effect on ROE. Model 2 control for 
tangibility, size and growth. LTDTA and Size have positive significant effect on 
ROE at 5% significant level, while Debt to Equity and Tangibility has negative 
significant effect on ROE this is consistent with Mustafa (2013). However, the 
growth ratio reveals a negative insignificant effect on ROE. 
The fixed effect analysis is depicted in models 3 and 4 above. Model 3 indicated 
that STDTA and LTDTA have positive significant effect on ROE, while D/E has 
negative significant effect on ROE. This is in part consistent with the result of 
(Osuji & Odita, 2012). Model 4 control for tangibility, size and growth. STDTA, 
LTDTA and Size have positive significant effect on ROE (Osuji & Odita, 2012; 
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Lawal et al., 2014), while D/E has a negative significant effect on ROE. However 
tangibility and growth shows a positive and negative insignificant effect 
respectively. 
The random effect result is captured in model 5 and 6. In model 5 LTDTA have 
positive significant effect on ROE (Osuji & Odita, 2012), while D/E have a 
negative significant effect on ROE. The effect of STDTA is positive but 
insignificant. However, the controlled model represented by model 6 reveals that 
LTDTA and size have positive significant effect on ROE (Osuji, 2012; Lucy, 2014; 
Mustafa, 2013) while Tang has a negative significant effect on ROE (Mustafa, 
2013). D/E and Growth shows a negative but insignificant effect on ROE. Lastly, 
the effect of STDTA is positive but insignificant. 
 
5. Conclusion  
Capital structure remains one of the most contentious issues in finance literature. 
This is however a resultant effect of the divergent conclusions of various 
theoretical and empirical submissions on the subject matter. 
This paper examines the impact of capital structure decision on financial 
performance using a sample of twenty-two non- financial firms in Nigeria between 
2011 and 2015. The study seeks to fill the gap in the existing literatures by 
combining both equity-based and naira-based performance variables to ascertain 
how impactful leverage is on firms‘ performance. In addition, the study also 
evaluates the validity of agency theory in the Nigeria context. 
The result indicates that performance measured by ROE is moderately positively 
influenced by leverage, while ROA interaction with leverage indicates negative 
relationship. This implies that, the inclusion of debt (both short term and long term) 
in the capital structure of a firm positively affect the equity shareholders in terms of 
firm performance while debt holder might be affected negatively. The results 
indicate that owners as principal benefit marginally from leverage while 
management‘s (agent‘s) measure of performance with respect to owners (principal) 
capital correlates substantially with leverage. Implicitly, capital structure of firms 
impact financial performance (measures of agents) than the real wealth of owners 
using Nigerian data. These findings lend credence to the agency theory, but 
contrast the conclusion of Varun (2014) who studied the Indian firms and 
concludes that leverage has negative impact on firms‘ performance, however, it is 
consistent with Mubeen and Kalsoom (2014) which indicated capital structure to 
positively impact both firm performance and shareholders wealth using Pakistan 
data. 
The results of this empirical study suggest that some of the insights from modern 
capital structure theories are applicable to Nigeria in that certain firm-specific 
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factors that are relevant for explaining capital structure and corporate performance 
in the developed economy are also relevant in Nigeria. The inefficiency of the 
Nigerian Capital Market may have indirectly influence the outcome of this study. 
This is because the capital structure theory envisaged corporate bond (long term 
debt) to be substantially utilized than money market based short term debt because 
the former is assumed to be cheaper than the latter, thus, more benefits to accrue to 
owners from its usage. The Nigerian Capital market needs reforms that will ensure 
reduction in its inefficiency and high volatility, as well as improved transparency. 
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